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3introduction 
Institutions and social capital are key factors of economic welfare, but 
interplay between the two remains a subject of debates. Some views (Keefer, 
Knack, 1997) maintain that formal institutions and social capital are sub-
stitutes, and therefore institutional reform can make up for insufficient so-
cial capital. Alternative opinions (Tabellini, 2008a) stress complementa-
rity between institutions and social capital, in which case a lack of social 
capital could pose an obstacle to an otherwise efficiency-enhancing insti-
tutional reform. A closely related issue is the identification of transmission 
mechanisms between social capital and development – apart from working 
at the grassroots by cutting transaction costs, social capital improves gover-
nance and institutional performance, and its deficit could render an insti-
tution dysfunctional. 
A case in point is the problem of the commons. Communities of users 
have stronger incentives than governments to better manage smaller-scale 
common-pool resources, and possess informational advantages over cen-
tralized control (Araral, 2009). However inability to resolve the inherent 
collective action problem could seriously impede self-management of the 
commons. 
Such problems are not unique to conventional commons in rural life 
and natural environment; they also occur in urban setting, and in particu-
lar have transpired in the recent residential housing reform in Russia. The 
reform started in the early 1990s with transfers to tenants of the property 
titles over individual units, and proceeded smoothly until the present stage 
of ‘collective privatization’, when control over common facilities and in-
frastructure of apartment buildings (hallways, elevators, building exteriors, 
parking, security, piping and wiring, etc.) is being devolved from local govern-
ments to tenants organized in condominium-like homeowners associations 
(HOA). 
Russian law defines HOA as a non-profit legal entity in which tenants 
are members and which has a governing board headed by a chairperson. 
HOA budget is funded by tenants’ maintenance fees and other revenues, 
including rentals of common property. HOA decisions that require tenants’ 
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approval are passed by simple majority vote. HOA can enter into contracts 
with local utilities and other service providers; it can retain services of a 
management company to which operations of common facilities can be 
outsourced. 
The process of HOA formation had a slow start, and accelerated of late 
(see Fig. 1), in large part due to sticks and carrots used by the government 
which is interested in de-politicizing the residential housing sector, cutting 
subsidies and waste and offloading the cost of housing maintenance on 
owners. Financial incentives to form HOA, such as cost-sharing of capital 
repairs, are combined with pressure to expedite HOA formation, lest local 
governments step in and do it for procrastinating tenants. Presently various 
forms of self-management of housing infrastructure have been introduced 
in about ¾ of all apartment buildings in Russia. 
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figure 1: HOA dynamics in Russia 
Collective privatization of residential housing proved to be much more 
difficult and controversial than privatization of individual apartments – de-
spite the strong promise and appeal of the HOA institution, its success was 
highly uneven (Vihavainen, 2009). Surveys, media reports and other sourc-
es reveal multiple problems facing HOA – from revenue shortfalls due to 
payment delinquency to the ‘capture’ of the new institutions by local bu-
reaucrats, utility operators and other parties (see e.g. Sivaev, 2009; Yer-
mishina, 2009). There is widespread distrust in the society in HOA – the 
oft sited reasons include lack of understanding of how this institution op-
erates, concerns of unpredictable liabilities that would escalate the cost of 
housing to households, reluctance to assume responsibilities for repairs of 
dilapidated buildings, unsettled land disputes, and poor conditions of the 
local utilities and housing maintenance sector where dominant providers 
often enjoy unfettered market power. One of the core issues is mistrust 
among tenants, lack of leadership and capacity for self-organization, and 
insufficient experience and culture of self-management of common prop-
erty. 
As a result, tenants are often reluctant to form HOA, despite govern-
ment’s prodding, and many of the existing HOAs function poorly, making 
their members nostalgic of the status quo ante, even if notorious for mis-
management, waste, and corruption. At the same time, there are quite a 
few success stories of well-functioning HOAs that were able to improve 
services, lower costs, cut wastes and otherwise take advantage of common 
property self-management. 
The short history of Russian HOAs provides rich evidence on how the 
society’s ability to operate a new institution affects the outcome of institu-
tional reform. It also illustrates how commons work or don’t work in urban 
setting, depending on material factors, social capital and the external in-
stitutional environment. 
In the present paper the disparate performance of Russian HOAs is an-
alyzed and explained by using data of a survey conducted in the late 2008. 
The survey registered satisfaction of tenants with HOA performance, as well 
as material and non-material factors, including various indexes and prox-
ies of social capital, that could affect the achieved outcomes. We estimate 
a stochastic frontier of Russian HOAs and thus obtain performance (pro-
ductivity) indexes which indeed exhibit significant variations reflecting suc-
cess and failures of individual HOAs. 
Comparisons of leaders and laggards among sampled HOAs, and regres-
sion analysis reveal tangible and intangible assets of HOAs that underpin 
success of self-management of urban commons, and shed light on the in-
terplay between institutions, social capital and organizational governance. 
It is shown that generic social capital has at best mild impact on HOA per-
formance; however we identify a specific type of social capital, called tech-
nical civic competence, which underpins the ability of tenant communities 
to effectively operate the institution of HOA. An important function of 
technical civic competence is to ensure efficient and accountable govern-
ance of urban commons – it is shown that HOA governance serves as a 
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transmission mechanism between social capital and HOA outcomes. How-
ever, if official governance mechanisms in HOA malfunction (e.g. as a re-
sult of capture), more primordial collective action mechanisms rise in their 
significance, and so does generic social capital. Our analysis also shows that 
better-performing HOAs do not engage services of management companies 
and prefer in-house provision; this is due to a lack of competition among 
service providers in the residential housing sector. Twin deficit of social 
capital as a means to operate a multiple agency, and of competition in the 
service industry that could have alleviated the collective action problem, 
explains poor state of many Russian HOAs. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section main 
issues of HOA are interpreted through the prism of the New Institutional 
Economics. Section 3 presents data, and in Section 4 HOA stochastic fron-
tier is estimated. In Section 5 regression analysis is conducted to study im-
pact on HOA performance of various factors, including social capital. Sec-
tion 6 deals with agency relations in HOA, to explore transmission mecha-
nisms for social capital working through HOA governance, and third-party 
outsourcing. Section 7 concludes. 
Hoa and nie 
Homeowner associations demonstrate a nexus of key issues and dilem-
mas of the New Institutional Economics, such as property rights, collective 
action and common agency, public choice, social capital and boundaries 
of the organization. The institutional perspective structures HOA analysis 
and generates hypotheses for empirical testing. 
Setting up an HOA is consistent with the property rights theory: when 
transaction costs are high, control rights over an asset should be held by di-
rect beneficiaries (Grossman, Hart, 1986), which ensures efficiency of un-
observable and non-contractible investments in the asset. In the case of 
common facilities of residential housing tenants are exclusive beneficiaries 
of such assets and therefore natural holders of property rights. Non-divis-
ibility of housing infrastructure makes such ownership collective. Since the 
same individuals are owners of infrastructure and consumers of its services, 
and given non-market nature of such services, HOA assumes the legal sta-
tus of a non-profit. 
Benefits of collective ownership could be outweighed by the collective 
action problem inherent to private provision of public goods and self-man-
agement of the commons. Housing infrastructure combines features of both, 
and when coordination is eroded by free riding, or tenants fail to reach and 
implement necessary agreements, collective ownership might no longer be 
the (second) best regime, yielding this position to other arrangements, such 
as local government management (Bengtsson, 1998; Saegert, Winkel, 1998; 
Chen, Webster, 2005). 
Complexity of the collective action problem grows with the number of 
participants (Olson, 1965), and this, ceteris paribus, makes HOA opera-
tions more complicated in large buildings. Lack of socialization among 
tenants in such buildings further exacerbates the problem. On the other 
hand, there is an economy of scale in running common facilities in resi-
dential housing, which favors bigger apartment buildings – the latter can 
get bulk discounts from service providers, afford high quality technical, le-
gal and accounting services, etc. Therefore the overall impact of the build-
ing size on performance of HOA is a priory ambiguous. 
Capacity for self-organization and collective action is known as social 
capital; its key ingredients are mutual trust, pro-social norms, and social 
networks (see e.g. Halpern, 2005). Social capital reduces transaction costs 
of reaching and implementing an agreement over a joint course of action 
necessary for efficient operation of housing infrastructure. Stocks of social 
capital in apartment buildings could exhibit broad variations, depending 
on socio-economic composition and heterogeneity of tenants, prevailing 
cultural norms and other factors (Saegert, Winkel, 1998). Home ownership 
is believed to foster civic attitudes and involvement – it raises importance 
of longer-term public matters and makes tenants concerned over market 
value of their property which capitalizes the state of common facilities and 
quality of local governance (DiPasquale, Glaeser, 1999). On the other hand, 
social capital shows strong inertia (Tabellini, 2008b), and societies where 
it is historically in short supply and/or where recent dramatic events de-
pleted the earlier endowments of social capital (Aghion et al., 2009), could 
be ill-prepared for self-management of urban commons. 
Still, chances for self-organization in residential housing are perhaps 
among the strongest in comparison with other collective action problems. 
Indeed, participants have immediate and powerful material incentives to 
handle well their collective property, they form a relatively small, stable and 
compact group with clear boundary rules, have opportunities for frequent 
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face-to-face communication, can set internal rules of the organization and 
elect governance bodies, and enjoy government recognition and support. 
These are the key design principles for successful self-organization (Os-
trom, 2000), and their confluence bodes well for HOA success even in so-
cieties with low stock of social capital and general lack of civic culture and 
tradition. Moreover, given the combination of these favorable conditions, 
the success (or lack thereof) of HOA could be viewed as a litmus test of the 
general ability of a society for self-organization. 
HOAs can outsource some of its functions to an outside contractor – a 
management company; costs and benefits of such option are discussed in 
the boundaries of organization theory. The management company serves as 
an intermediary between the HOA and its various suppliers, including local 
utilities. Benefits of such outsourcing are due to professional expertise of 
management companies and the economy of scale that they have when deal-
ing with multiple client associations. However if management companies 
have significant market power (this is often the case in Russia where such 
companies are commonly affiliated with local governments and have other 
‘specific assets’ preventing competitive entry), they become parts of verti-
cally integrated monopoly chains occupying the middle position between 
public utilities and tenants, with detrimental consequences for the latter. 
HOAs face with collective choice and common agency problems. The first 
of these problems arises over HOA revenue (maintenance fees) and expend-
iture decisions, which require reconcilement of at times deeply polarized 
taxation and spending preferences, especially when there is profound eco-
nomic inequality between tenants. In the West such inequality is less pro-
nounced due to sorting by real estate prices, but in Russia it is still found in 
older buildings where neighbours could significantly differ from each oth-
er in income and status, and even in new condominiums where some apart-
ment units are sold at market prices, while others are transferred by devel-
opers over to local governments to be distributed free or at heavy discounts 
as “social housing”. 
The common agency problem occurs in relations between tenants and 
external contractors (management companies) and/or governing bodies of 
HOA. Multiplicity of ‘principals’ in a principal-agent setting makes mon-
itoring performance of contractors and association’s officers more compli-
cated: free riding could undermine such monitoring and adversely affect 
accountability. The Russian law leaves the option of direct management of 
common facilities by tenants without setting up a formal association; this 
eliminates the agency problem inside the HOA, but obviously elevates trans-
action costs in dealing with third parties.1 
When HOAs and their governing bodies are not sufficiently controlled 
by tenants due to low participation and weak monitoring at the grassroots, 
there is a danger that this institution will be captured by various interest 
groups that seek private gains at the expense of tenants. This danger is real 
when significant resources and vital services are transferred from local gov-
ernments to the private (for-profit and non-profit) domain with weaker 
governance and control mechanisms. HOA are appealing targets for cap-
ture, given low elasticity of their demand for essential services, non-com-
petitive nature of local utilities, and the prospects of obtaining property ti-
tles to land under an apartment building. Potential captors could be local 
bureaucrats, operators of public utilities and management companies, and 
insiders – HOA members that put under their control resources of the or-
ganization. Anticipation of HOA vulnerability to capture makes tenants 
apprehensive of the new institution and reluctant to set up an HOA in the 
first instance. 
Hypotheses and data
HOA, viewed as a production unit that generates a stream of services to 
its members, employs various inputs which affect the output; furthermore 
its performance depends on market conditions and institutional environ-
ment. The inputs include HOA revenues and members’ contributions in 
kind, as well as tangible and intangible assets of the association, which are 
set exogenously. The tangible assets are apartment buildings where HOA op-
erate, characterized by their size and conditions. The main intangible asset 
is the capacity for collective action and self-organization, or social capital. 
It should be expected that both of these types of assets positively affect 
HOA performance. However, in regard to the intangible assets this assump-
tion needs a refinement. The earlier views of social capital as a generic ho-
1 In transactions over private goods and assets intermediation on behalf of a community 
could be detrimental to community members, since intermediaries might not have infor-
mation and incentives necessary for efficient representation (Katz, Neuman, 1990). In the 
case of public (club) goods such collective representation could be desirable as a means to 
prevent the hold-up problem and otherwise reduce transaction costs. 
10 11
mogeneous commodity that invariably improves performance of every or-
ganization, economy, or society, were refuted in the recent literature, and 
available evidence leads to the conclusion that performance-enhancing 
forms and kinds of social capital could be highly context-specific (see e.g. 
Halpern, 2005). An empirical strategy should thus allow testing various 
measures and proxies of social capital to find out which, if any, of them im-
prove performance of Russian HOAs. Once HOA-relevant forms of social 
capital are identified, relative impacts of tangible and intangible HOA as-
sets could be estimated to find out which of those are more essential for 
HOA operation. An answer to this question will also shed light on an oth-
erwise ambiguous relation between HOA efficiency and building size. 
The working of social capital is another matter that requires attention. 
Social capital could improve performance ‘horizontally’, at the grassroots, 
by cutting various transaction costs, or ‘vertically’, by strengthening ac-
countability in agency relations with governance bodies and third parties. 
To identify a ‘transmission mechanism’ between social capital and institu-
tional performance in the case of Russian HOA, an empirical analysis should 
include measures of the quality of organization governance to explore its 
influence on outcomes and relations to social capital. 
To capture the impact of external environment on HOA, one needs data 
covering a sufficiently large number of cities. Collecting such data was be-
yond our means, and hence main attention in this paper will be paid to the 
working of internal factors of organizational effectiveness, with only occa-
sional references to the role of external conditions. 
Data for the study was obtained by a survey of 82 HOA conducted in the 
fall of 2008; of those HOA, 40 were based in Russia’s capital city of Mos-
cow, and the rest in a major industrial city of Perm. Sample selection was 
controlled over three dimensions: apartment price; time elapsed since build-
ing construction/capital repair; and the year HOA was created. In each 
HOA, the chairperson and nine other randomly selected tenants were in-
terviewed. 
Questions of the survey were organized in the following categories2: 
performance assessment: (i) 
overall satisfaction with HOA performance and satisfaction with  •
main services of HOA, such as common facilities maintenance; 
2 Some of the questions were similar to those used in (Saegert, Winkel, 1998) in a study 
of US residential housing. 
plumbing; electrical work; upkeep of the backyard; and garbage re-
moval
satisfaction with HOA board performance, transparency and ac- •
countability of board work 
socio-economic and demographic characteristics of tenants (age, (ii) 
gender, education, income bracket), and duration of tenancy 
social cohesion of tenants (various indicators of trust, mutual as-(iii) 
sistance and support, acquaintance, interaction, and socializing in every-
day life)
contributions to HOA in cash and in kind (accuracy of payments (iv) 
of maintenance fees and utility bills3; participation in tenant meetings; vol-
unteering)
ability to reach an agreement over HOA operations (v) 
In addition, the survey collected information about HOA (and the apart-
ment building where it is based) in general, including age and material con-
ditions of the building, the year HOA was formed, the origin of HOA (cre-
ated by tenants on their own initiative, or thrust by third parties – local gov-
ernments, management companies, developers etc.); percentage of private-
ly owned units (the rest are owned by local governments), and whether HOA 
operates on its own or retains services of a management company. 
Generic social capital in tenant communities can be measured by using 
answers to questions whether one can count on neighbors’ support; how 
often a respondent assisted his/her neighbors and how often received sup-
port from them; and how many neighbors and how well a respondent knows. 
Other proxies of generic social capital are voluntary work in HOA and du-
ration of tenancy in the building (the longer people live next to each other, 
the better chances they have to develop social ties, cohesion and empa-
thy). 
A specific form of social capital is the collective ability to operate an 
HOA; it can be inferred from tenants’ self-reported degree of participation 
in HOA decision-making; from the ability to have one’s voice heard in the 
process; and from the ease of reaching an agreement among tenants on 
HOA matters. Answers to these questions are significantly correlated with 
each other, and their first principal component, explaining 58% of the to-
3 Russian HOAs collect from tenants utility payments and remit those to utility provid-
ers. 
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tal variation, is used to measure what we call technical civic competence of 
tenants.
The above components of generic social capital are as a rule positively 
and statistically significantly correlated with each other, which is an indi-
cation that these are indeed various dimensions of the same ‘commodity’ 
(Table 1). At the same time generic social capital and technical civic com-
petence are disparate characteristics of tenant communities, largely uncor-
related with each other: technical civic competence has statistically signif-
icant correlation with only one dimension of generic social capital, and this 
correlation has the negative sign. 
Table 1: Cross-correlations of social capital 
GSC1 GSC2 GSC3 YT SI VW TCC
GSC1
GSC2 .34*
GSC3 .35* .72*
YT .29* .19
SI .48* .44* .27
VW .47* .30 .38* .57*
TCC -.23
GSC1 – perception of availability of neighbors’ support; GSC2 – frequency of 
assisting neighbors; GSC3 – frequency of being assisted by neighbors; YT – years 
of tenancy; SI – social inclusion; VW – voluntary work; TCC – technical civic 
competence. Only correlations significant at 10% level are shown; significance at 1% 
level is marked by*. 
The data reveal considerable differences between the two cities covered 
by the sample. In Moscow overall tenant satisfaction with HOA work is 
higher than in Perm – the distributions of responses in a 1 to 5 scale sto-
chastically dominate each other (Fig. 2a). Satisfactions with particular serv-
ices in the two cities follow the same pattern. But maintenance fees in Mos-
cow are also higher (Fig. 2b), and therefore the question of HOAs’ relative 
efficiency, which puts outcomes in relation to inputs, remain open until the 
next section. 
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figure 2b: Costs to tenants of HOA services (rubles per household) 
Two cities also differ in their physical capital stocks in the residential 
housing sector (apartment buildings in Moscow are on the average 50% 
bigger and four years older), and, more significantly, in their endowments 
of social capital in tenant communities. Stocks of generic social capital 
characterized by the above indicators of social cohesion are somewhat high-
er in Perm – social ties are expected to be stronger is a smaller and more 
traditional city (Fig. 3a). However the collective ability to operate an HOA, 
which is a specific form of social capital, is significantly higher in Moscow: 
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distribution of the technical civic competence in Moscow (stochastically) 
dominates such distribution in Perm (Fig. 3b). 
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figure 3b: Technical civic competence
Quality of governance in HOA can be measured using tenants’ assess-
ments of timeliness and quality of HOA board work; of timeliness, accu-
racy and completeness of information disseminated by boards to tenants; 
and of boards’ accountability and quality of representation of tenants. Such 
indexes are strongly correlated with each other (as is often the case with 
alternative quality of governance indicators, not just in organizations, but 
also on regional and national levels – see e.g. Putnam, 1993, Tabellini, 
2008a), and their first principal component which accounts for 88% of the 
total variation, is used hereafter as a quality of HOA governance index. This 
index shows that HOA in Moscow are governed better than in Perm (Fig. 
4), which is consistent with the earlier observed lead of the Russian capital 
city in technical civic competence of tenants (more on this is Section 6). 
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figure 4: HOA board performance 
Performance assessment 
Performance of HOAs and the institution of collective ownership of 
common housing facilities that such organizations implement can be meas-
ured by standard productivity analysis tools which approximate the ‘pro-
duction frontier’. Such techniques are broadly used in productivity studies 
of various public and private sector organizations (hospitals, universities, 
government agencies, utilities, farms, banks etc.), but to the best of our 
knowledge they have not been applied so far to performance assessment of 
non-profit associations, including HOAs. And yet, as we argue elsewhere 
(Borisova, Polishchuk, 2008), these techniques have strong advantages over 
other approaches to efficiency measurement in the non-profit sector, e.g. 
they produce indexes that are relative to highest achievable outcomes re-
vealed by a large number of observation, which compensates for otherwise 
unavailable market information. 
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To apply production frontier estimation techniques4, we treat HOA as a 
production unit that produces N outputs 
 
y = y1 ,..., yn( ) and utilizes single 
(non-exogenous) input x; here outputs are services to tenants, and input – 
the budget of the association. It is assumed that to every x there corresponds 
a production possibility set 
 
P x( ) ⊂ R N , and the organization with input-
output bundle (x, y) is fully efficient if y belongs to the boundary of P(x).5 
Efficiency (productivity) is measured by the distance function 
 
D x , y( ) = min θ > 0 | yθ ∈P x( )
⎧
⎨
⎩
⎫
⎬
⎭
; this function attains its maximal value 
of unity in the case of full efficiency. Otherwise the greater is the deviation 
from the boundary inwards the production possibility set, the less efficient 
is the organization. 
To estimate the distance function by using the stochastic frontier tech-
nique6, the following translog specification (Lovell, 1994) was assumed: 
 
ln D (x , y ) = α0 + αn ln yn
n=1
N
∑ + βnm ln yn
n,m=1
N
∑ ln ym + γ ln x + δn ln yn ln x
n=1
N
∑ ,
which after standard transformations that make use of first-degree homo-
geneity of D(x, y) in y, can be estimated from the following equation: 
 
ln yNi = α0 + αn ln
n=1
N −1
∑ yniyNi
+ βnm ln
yni
yNin,m=1
N −1
∑ ln ymiyNi
+
+γ ln x + δn ln
yni
yNi
ln x
n=1
N −1
∑ + ui + νi ,
where ui ≤ 0 measures inefficiency and is distributed half-normal (normal 
distribution truncated at zero), and vi is a normally distributed error term. 
Once this latter equation is estimated, the distance function (efficiency in-
dex) for observation i obtains as exp ui.
4 We present here an abridged version of stochastic frontier analysis of homeowners’ as-
sociations; for more details and alternative estimation techniques see Borisova, Peresetsky, 
Polishchuk, 2010. 
5 Notice that this efficiency concept does not specify proportions between partial per-
formance measures, i.e. satisfaction with particular services of HOA; this flexibility allows 
for various public choice outcomes within individual HOAs. 
6 Stochastic frontier approach is preferable to the alternative non-parametric data envel-
opment analysis due to unavoidable measurement errors in survey-generated data. 
In our calculations output measures were respondents’ satisfaction with 
HOA services listed in the previous section, and estimation was carried out 
by the maximum likelihood method, with individual characteristics of re-
spondents, city dummies, and price category of housing serving as control 
variables. 
Estimated stochastic frontier indeed reveals significant performance var-
iations (Fig. 5); moreover, Moscow-based HOAs on the average perform 
better than those in Perm, but their performance displays wider fluctua-
tions (Fig. 6). 
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Prior to a more regular analysis of the causes of observed variations, 
which is presented in the next section, it is worthwhile to look into com-
mon patterns of organizations-leaders and see what distinguishes them from 
the rest of the sample and especially from the laggards at the bottom of the 
distribution. Leaders have substantially larger endowments of technical civ-
ic competence, but are barely distinguishable from the rest of the sample, 
including the laggards, in stocks of generic social capital. Socio-economic 
inequality among tenants in HOAs-leaders is less pronounced, and pay-
ment delinquency is much rarer. Leaders are 2.5 times bigger (in the number 
of tenants) than laggards; tenants in such HOA are more satisfied with serv-
ices but also pay higher maintenance fees. In leading HOAs virtually all 
units are privately owned, whereas among laggards on the average 1/3 of 
the units belong to municipal governments (which have proportional vot-
ing and control rights in such HOAs). More than 80% of leading HOAs were 
established by tenants, whereas among laggards this share is less than 50%. 
Significantly, none of the leaders outsource HOA operations to a manage-
ment company, whereas almost 2/3 of the laggards retain services of such 
companies
explaining performance 
Assets, constraints, and operational conditions of an organization which 
are beyond its control, are exogenous variables, which, unlike controllable 
inputs, are not included in productivity measurement through production 
possibility frontier. Rather, the impact of such exogenous factors could be 
studied after the production frontier is estimated, by directly regressing on 
these factors the obtained performance indexes. We are primarily interest-
ed in the role played by main tangible and intangible assets of HOAs, i.e. 
physical and social capital. 
To apply the proposed methodology, an aggregation problem must be 
addressed, which is due to the fact that primary observations in the sample 
are surveyed tenants, whereas performance (efficiency) indexes are derived 
for HOAs comprising multiple tenants. Several strategies can be used to re-
solve this problem – one is to aggregate individual responses prior to esti-
mation of the production frontier, and treat HOAs as observations, anoth-
er – to handle the sample as panel data, and hold the inefficiency term ui 
the same for all respondents from a given HOA, and finally a yet another to 
calculate “individual inefficiencies” for every respondent and aggregate 
them a posteriori. All three strategies were tested and produced similar re-
sults; the third one proved to be the most practical and was used in estima-
tions reported below.7 
We begin with the following core set of exogenous variables in a regres-
sion model: age of the building (a proxy for the physical condition); tech-
nical civic competence; generic social capital (measured by availability of 
neighborly support); origin of HOA (dummy of whether the HOA was cre-
ated by tenants, instead of a third party); size of HOA (number of house-
holds); percentage of apartments which are privately owned; and socio-
economic inequality among tenants. Regression results are reported in Col-
umn (1) of Table 2. 
Physical and specific social capital stocks are the exogenous variables 
that are most significantly related to HOA efficiency – one standard de-
viation of building’s age translates in 2/3 standard deviation of HOA per-
formance, whereas increase of technical civic competence of tenants by 
one standard deviation improves performance of HOA by 39 per cent of 
standard deviation. Significance and explanatory power of generic social 
capital are significantly weaker. 
While it is hardly surprising that newer buildings are ceteris paribus 
easier to run, the relative (in)significance of different kinds of social capi-
tal is a priory much less obvious. It appears that conventional measures of 
social capital per se are not good predictors of tenant’s ability to resolve 
the collective action problem in jointly operating common facilities of their 
building – what is required for success are specialized traits which under-
pin the ability to reach and implement an agreement over a joint course of 
action. 
Two other statistically significant predictors of HOA efficiency are the 
origin of the organization and per cent of privately owned units. The first 
of these factors has the expected sign: if an HOA is established by tenants’ 
own joint decision, this is credible evidence – indeed, a signal – of their 
confidence in the ability to jointly operate common property. 
The sign of the second factor shows that HOA performance improves 
when more decision-making authority is vested with tenants rather than 
7 For more on aggregation of individual responses into building-wide indexes see Saeg-
ert, Winkel, 1998. Further details of explaining HOA performance by econometric models 
can be found in Borisova, Peresetsky, Polishchuk, 2010. 
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with local governments that has voting rights on behalf of municipally owned 
units. This finding is plausible, but not a foregone conclusion: although, as 
it was stated earlier, tenants have strong informational and motivational 
advantages in running common property, those can be outweighed by dif-
ficulties of the collective action problem, in which case a consolidated po-
sition of the local government in HOA’s decision-making could be a way 
out of a gridlock. It turns out that the first of the above arguments ends up 
being stronger, than the second. This conclusion can be reinforced by di-
viding the sample in two equal halves with the percentage of privately owned 
units above and below the median – technical civic competence of tenants 
is significant only in the upper half, whereas in the lower one the only sig-
nificant factor is the age of the building. 
Size of HOA has no significant impact on performance – this is consist-
ent with the presence of two opposite effects mentioned above – the econ-
omy of scale, which favors bigger HOAs, and the collective action problem 
which is easier to solve in smaller groups. The regression shows that these 
factors more or less cancel off each other.8 However if the sample is again 
divided into halves, this time by HOA size, then social capital is significant 
only in the lower half of smaller HOAs, whereas for bigger ones the only 
significant factor is the technical conditions of the building proxied by its 
age. This is consistent with Olson’s (1965) views of the role of group size in 
the collective action problem: smaller size improves odds of resolving such 
problem, and social capital allows tenants to take advantage of such op-
portunity, whereas in large groups exceeding ‘the radius of trust’ (Fuku-
yama, 1995) size dominates over social capital and the latter loses its sig-
nificance. 
To check robustness of the above conclusions and see if any other exog-
enous factors, including alternative characteristics of generic social capital, 
could be affecting performance of HOAs, the core set of regressors was 
gradually expended by adding one-by-one measures of inequality among 
tenants; participation in HOA meetings; social inclusion; and accuracy of 
maintenance fee payments. Regression results are reported in columns (2) 
to (5) of Table 2: most of the time these newly added factors are insignifi-
cant and have only mild influence on the impact and significance of the 
core factors. 
making use of institution: governance and contracting
Day-to-day responsibilities of running an HOA are delegated to its board, 
headed by chairperson, which has the executive authority over spending, 
operations etc. HOA can also outsource its operations to a specialized man-
agement company. Performances of the board and management company 
(if any) are critically important for the overall success of HOA. In both cas-
8 In some specifications of the regression model the impact of size was mildly significant 
and positive, but such results were not robust. 
Table 2: Impact of exogenous variables on HOA efficiency 
(1)
Core 
factors
(2) (3) (4) (5)
Full list of 
factors
Building age -0.544***
(0.001)
-0.537***
(0.001)
-0.557*** 
(0.001)
-0.572***
(0.001)
-0.664***
(0.001)
Technical 
competence
0.416***
(0.011)
0.414***
(0.011)
0.420***
(0.012)
0.399***
(0.012)
0.425***
(0.011)
Generic social 
capital 
0.175*
(0.026)
0.169*
(0.028)
0.167*
(0.029)
0.182*
(0.029)
NS
Origin 0.194**
(0.024)
0.193*
(0.025)
0.200**
(0.025)
0.231**
(0.025)
0.210**
(0.022)
Size NS NS NS NS NS
% private ownership 0.195**
(0.000)
0.191**
(0.000)
0.190**
(0.000)
NS 0.145*
(0.000)
Inequality NS NS NS NS
Participation in 
meetings 
NS NS NS
Social inclusion -0.195*
(0.013)
NS
Payment discipline NS
R-squared 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.54 0.71
Adj. R-squared 0.45 0.44 0.44 0.46 0.64
Observations 67 67 66 66 49
All coefficients are standardized. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance 
at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***. 
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es there is an agency problem, and due to multiplicity of principals (the 
tenants), it could become a hard-to-resolve problem of collective action. 
Lack of accountability and weak monitoring by tenants due to free-riding 
could condone sloppy performance of the board and/or management com-
pany, or even allow HOA capture with detrimental consequences for the 
intended beneficiaries of this institution – the tenants. There are multiple 
reports of such failures of the agency relations in the Russian residential 
housing sector (see e.g. Yasin, 2005; Sivaev, 2009), and therefore efficiency 
analysis of HOAs in Russia will not be complete without looking into these 
key issues. 
Correlation between HOA governance index and overall HOA perform-
ance in our sample equals .38; strong and statistically significant relation 
between these measures (Fig. 7) underscores importance of governance for 
common ownership of housing infrastructure. 
 R2 = 0.1474
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figure 7: HOA governance and efficiency 
In its turn, quality of HOA governance, as one would expect, is predi-
cated on the specific social capital among tenants – their technical civic 
competence. It is noteworthy that generic social capital plays no significant 
role in explaining board performance. 
The above results show that the board channels specific social capital 
into HOA outcomes, thus serving as a ‘transmission device’ between the 
two. To find out if the board makes an independent contribution into HOA 
performance, unrelated to tenants’ technical civic competence, we ran a 
regression of HOA efficiency on board work and generic and specific social 
capital and found that ‘in the shadow’ of specific social capital the board 
loses significance (and generic social capital remains insignificant as well). 
This leads to the conclusion that it would be unrealistic to expect that a lack 
of tenants’ capacity to operate HOA could be made up by good governance 
dues ex machina – without social capital at the grassroots there would be 
no forces for such substitution. 
Table 3: HOA board performance 
Technical competence 0.741***
(0.126)
Generic social capital NS
R-squared 0.57
Adj. R-squared 0.53
Observations 75
All coefficients are standardized. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance 
at the 1% level is represented by ***. 
Table 4:  Regression of HOA performance on social capital and performance  
of the board 
Board performance NS
Generic social capital NS
Technical competence 0.275*
(0.019)
R-squared 0.17
Adj. R-squared 0.13
Observations 73
All coefficients are standardized. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance 
at the 10% level is represented by *. 
To get further insight into the interplay between governance, social cap-
ital, and the organizational performance, and identify possible non-linear 
effects involved, we again divide the sample into two parts, with board per-
formance resp. above and below the sample average. It turns out that with 
underperforming board generic social capital becomes significant for the 
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overall performance of the organization – inability to use official govern-
ance mechanisms of the institution makes tenants resorting to more ‘pri-
mordial’ direct alternatives, raising importance of generic social capital. 
Properly functioning board ‘idles’ generic social capital which loses sig-
nificance – specific social capital is what matters in such case. 
Table 5: HOA performance factors with efficient and inefficient governance 
(1)
Above-average board 
efficiency
(2)
Below-average board efficiency
Building age –0.534***
(0.001)
–0.786***
(0.001)
Technical competence 0.416***
(0.019)
NS
Generic social capital NS 0.273**
(0.036)
Origin 0.284**
(0.031)
NS
Size NS NS
% private ownership NS 0.273*
(0.000)
R-squared 0.44 0.66
Adj. R-squared 0.32 0.57
Observations 37 30
All coefficients are standardized. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance 
at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***. 
Turning to the second type of agency relations – with a management 
company – recall that such companies are supposed to bring in advantag-
es of specialization and economy of scale. Since the Russian law allows 
the backup option of direct management of an HOA without outsourcing 
these functions to a third party, revealed preferences-type reasoning sug-
gests that all else being equal, HOAs working with management companies 
should be expected to do better than those working without outside pro-
fessional help. 
The data shows that the opposite is true: on the average those HOAs in 
the sample that work without management companies achieve 10% higher 
efficiency score (.83) than those working with such companies (.75). Recall 
that none of the most successful HOAs described in Section 4 engage serv-
ices of management companies, whereas such companies are involved with 
two of every three of worst-performing organizations. 
The puzzle is explained by the fact that more often than not involve-
ment of a management company is not a free choice of tenants: out of 52 
HOAs in the sample that were established by tenants themselves, only 6, or 
12%, work with management companies, whereas among 29 HOAs that 
were created by third parties – local authorities, developers, and sometimes 
management companies themselves, 11, or 38%, engage services of man-
agement companies. This is consistent with numerous complaints about 
Russian management companies which often fail to deliver value for mon-
ey and used as instruments of HOA capture. One of the main reasons for 
this frustration is a lack of competition – in many instances management 
companies are privatized municipal services that enjoy near-monopoly pow-
er in their localities (Yasin, 2005). Competitive entry in this industry is ob-
structed by a lack of required production assets, and administrative barriers 
raised by local governments which could have informal affiliations with 
dominant providers of management services. Under such circumstances 
HOAs often prefer to make do on their own, without outsourcing to man-
agement companies. This appears to be the second-best choice, which how-
ever denies Russian homeowners the benefits of professional management 
of their common facilities. 
Such losses could be not too dramatic for successful HOA where apart-
ment buildings are in good conditions and tenants have enough social cap-
ital to elect honest and competent individuals to run the association, and 
to properly monitor performance of HOA officers afterwards. In the case 
of less fortunate tenant communities a competitive management services 
industry could have made a big difference by alleviating the lack of inner 
capacity to resolve the collective action problem.9 Competition delivers 
performance through market discipline even if the ability to ensure such 
9 Substitution between social capital among tenants and management companies com-
petition is illustrated by the experience of HOAs in Taiwan, where tenants were often unable 
to ensure efficient management of common facilities on their own, and thus reluctant to 
form HOAs, not unlike in Russia. The growth of Taiwanese HOA was driven by “…highly 
competitive and innovative property companies – rather than through HOA governance 
structures per se. The latter are characterised by many of the same problems that weigh 
down conventional municipal government.” (Chen, Webster, 2004). 
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performance within a multiple agency setting vis-à-vis an individual man-
agement company is weak. It is therefore unfortunate that Russian home-
owners are faced with a twin deficit of social capital inside their communi-
ties and outside competition of management companies. 
concluding remarks 
The short history of Russian HOAs confirms the general dictum that 
‘slow-moving institutions’, first and foremost social norms and culture, 
could impede faster-unfolding institutional reform (Roland, 2004). Mate-
rial factors certainly play an important role in uneven outcomes of HOA 
reform – growing rift between the escalating costs of maintenance and util-
ities, on the one hand, and household incomes, on the other, especially in 
poorer neighborhoods, where buildings urgently need repair, and wages are 
low, makes tenants reluctant to assume responsibility for common facilities 
of their houses. Social factors however also play a major role – a lack of 
ability to operate the new institution could turn it into a dysfunctional 
‘empty shelf’ prone to capture and other kinds of misuse. 
Complementary input that is required to properly self-manage urban 
commons is the social capital. Due to historical reasons, mainly a long his-
tory of authoritarian rule and further recent depletion during economic 
hardship and dislocation of the post-communist transition, the stock of 
social capital in Russia is low, and exists largely in obsolete forms (Rose, 
2000) which are poorly suited for running modern institutions. Account-
able governance seems to be the crux of the matter, and this is a collective 
action problem which is among the hardest to resolve. Our analysis shows 
that HOA governance is as good as tenants’ social capital, and therefore 
hopes that good governance could still be possible against the backdrop of 
passive society appear to be groundless, at least in the case of HOAs. A lack 
of competition in the housing services industry denies Russian HOAs an 
external remedy for unresolved collective action problem, creating an in-
stitutional stalemate. 
Commonly observed frustration in the institution of HOA and reluc-
tance to form HOAs is a natural reaction to the above problems. Despite of 
poor track record of local governments’ maintenance of residential hous-
ing, it is viewed by many as a preferred option to self-management (such 
sentiments are consistent with the general pattern of longing for more gov-
ernment regulation, even of low quality, in societies with a lack of social 
capital – see Aghion et al., 2009). 
The general conclusion of the presented analysis is that design of effi-
cient institutions for urban commons, as for the commons in general (Os-
trom, 1990), requires greater flexibility (Saegert, Winkel, 1998), and in par-
ticular attention to social conditions on the ground, which could render 
‘best-practice institutions’ non-performing. 
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Эффективность российских товариществ собственников жилья (ТСЖ) – некоммер-
ческих ассоциаций, создаваемых для совместного управления общей собственностью в 
жилых домах, измеряется в работе при помощи метода стохастической границы. Расче-
ты показывают, что эффективность охваченных исследованием ТСЖ колеблется в весьма 
широких пределах. Обнаруженные вариации эффективности объясняются воздействием 
физических и социальных факторов. Наиболее важным среди последних является нали-
чие среди жильцов социального капитала, необходимого для решения проблемы коллек-
тивных действий и подотчетности правления ТСЖ. Нехватка социального капитала мо-
жет стать препятствием эффективному самоуправлению в жилищном секторе и создать 
угрозу «захвата» института ТСЖ ради извлечения частной выгоды теми или иными внеш-
ними силами.
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